Permission-Aware RAG: Identity and Access Management (IAM)-Based Access Filtering in Multi-Resource Environments
Authors’ abstract
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge sources, which significantly improves response accuracy and contextual relevance. However, most existing RAG research implicitly assumes that all retrieved content is equally accessible to any user. This approach fails to address the complex, fine-grained access control required in enterprise environments in which data originates from multiple, independently governed sources. Attempting to merge heterogeneous authorization models, such as RBAC and ABAC, often leads to significant compliance burdens and unintended data exposure. To address this issue, we propose a permission-aware RAG framework that enforces resource-level access control by directly interfacing with provider-controlled Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems. By performing real-time permission validation against native IAM endpoints without requiring policy merging, this design preserves governance boundaries and ensures compliance. We implemented a prototype and conducted a comprehensive evaluation using a multi-hop QA benchmark. The evaluation included scenario-based qualitative analysis to verify policy enforcement, large-scale quantitative validation that confirms its scalable policy enforcement and quantifies the impact of access levels on answer quality. Results demonstrate that our framework provides secure, scalable information retrieval while maintaining strict adherence to diverse access policies across multi-resource environments. INDEX TERMS Access control, identity and access management (IAM), large language models (LLMs), multi-resource environments, permission-aware retrieval, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), secure information retrieval. I. INTRODUCTION Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remark-able capabilities in a wide range of natural language tasks, leading to significant advances in AI applications [1]. How-ever, when deployed in domain-specific or high-stakes envi-ronments, LLMs face notable limitations, including in fields such as healthcare [2], [3], law [4], and finance [5]. In partic-ular, LLMs lack access to up-to-date or institution-specific knowledge at inference time, undermining their reliabil-ity and effectiveness for critical decision-making [6]. To The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sedat Akleylek. mitigate this gap, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising approach that enhances LLMs by injecting relevant external documents retrieved from structured or unstructured knowledge sources directly into the generation pipeline [7]. Most existing RAG research implicitly assumes a uniform access model, where all retrieved content is equally accessible to any user of the system [6], [8]. This implicit-trust approach is fundamentally incompatible with the modern principles of a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) [9], which mandate fine-grained, per-resource authorization based on the principle of least privilege. This assumption fails to address the access control challenges that arise in multi-organizational or multi-service environments, where data originates from sources governed by distinct identity and policy frameworks. As a result, these systems fall short in addressing real-world scenarios where fine-grained, user-specific authorization is required to ensure privacy, security, and regulatory compliance. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the same query can produce different responses depending on the user’s access level. For example, public users may be limited to viewing basic prod-uct specifications and publicly available reviews, whereas authorized employees might retrieve confidential internal reports or proprietary analyses. This scenario highlights the necessity for enforcing user-specific access control in RAG systems, especially in multi-source environments where the sensitivity and ownership of data vary across sources. Current RAG architectures lack mechanisms necessary for fine-grained, context-aware access control. When a centralized vector database aggregates documents from multiple data providers, applying a unified access policy across all content becomes both operationally complex and legally impractical. Centralized attempts to merge policies often result in permission escalation, ambiguous policy interpretation, and significant compliance overhead. Fur-thermore, integrating heterogeneous access control models, such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [10] and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [11], into a single enforcement layer can introduce semantic inconsistencies and lead to unintended data leakage. To address these challenges, we propose a Permission-Aware RAG framework that enables fine-grained access control across multi-resource environments. Our approach preserves centralized retrieval efficiency while delegating access control to Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems operated by each provider. Instead of attempting to merge or reinterpret access policies, the framework dynamically verifies document-level permissions at query time by interfacing with native IAM endpoints such as Google Cloud Platform (GCP) IAM, Amazon Web Services (AWS) IAM, or open-source Keycloak. By leveraging existing IAM infrastructures that are already trusted and maintained by each organization, our approach ensures policy consistency and practical deployability. This decen-tralized control model reduces legal risks, respects policy autonomy, and ensures compatibility with diverse security architectures. The key contributions of this paper are as follows: • We propose a novel RAG framework that supports permission-aware retrieval across multi-resource envi-ronments by enabling fine-grained access control across heterogeneous policy domains. • We implemented a prototype integrated with GCP, AWS, and Keycloak IAM, validating the feasibility of our approach in real-world environments. • We validate the framework through three evaluations on the HotpotQA dataset: (i) scenario-based qualitative evaluation, (ii) large-scale quantitative evaluation, and (iii) latency impact evaluation. II. RELATED WORK A. ACCESS CONTROL NEEDS IN RAG SYSTEMS RAG systems are increasingly used in multi-resource envi-ronments where knowledge is distributed across diverse data sources. For example, in many enterprises, data resources are distributed across multiple departments, services, and infras-tructure environments. In healthcare organizations, patient records may be stored separately within hospitals, clinics, and research labs due to privacy policies, organizational boundaries, and system silos. In finance, investment reports, client data, and regulatory documents are often managed using different cloud providers, on-premise servers, or SaaS platforms depending on departmental budgets, policies, and compliance requirements. Such fragmented environments make centralized data integration challenging and result in complex multi-resource settings that RAG systems must operate within [12]. Each data source is governed by its own access con-trol policies and regulatory requirements. Healthcare data must comply with HIPAA [13], GDPR [14], and local privacy laws. Financial data is subject to strict industry-specific regulations, and government documents often require strict security clearances. Furthermore, these policies are implemented using heterogeneous models such as RBAC or ABAC, making unified enforcement complex. Without aligning retrieval processes with these diverse policies, RAG systems risk unauthorized disclosure, policy conflicts, and regulatory violations [15], [16]. Therefore, RAG systems require fine-grained (resource-specific), user-specific, and real-time access validation mech-anisms. However, existing RAG frameworks lack built-in capabilities to perform such dynamic authorization at query time. The need for such mechanisms has been formally recognized in recent security analyses of RAG systems. For instance, a systematic review by Ammann et al. identifies Retrieval Data Leakage as a primary threat and proposes Access Limitation as a critical mitigation strategy [17]. This underscores the academic and practical importance of developing robust access control frameworks specifically for RAG. Therefore, a central challenge in RAG security research is to determine how to effectively implement this Access Limitation in complex, real-world enterprise environments. B. REPRESENTATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATED ACCESS CONTROL Prior research has proposed multiple strategies for integrating access control into RAG systems. As illustrated in Fig. 2, these approaches can be broadly categorized into centralized and distributed architectures, depending on how documents are stored and policies enforced. Centralized frameworks consolidate documents from various sources into a single vector database and apply internal filtering mechanisms. For example, Chen et al. [18] proposed a proof-of-concept implementation that maintains a centralized vector database alongside an internal permission store. A more structured centralized approach is seen in VAULT, which models access control rules directly within a Knowledge Graph [19]. However, this model necessitates a complex and continuous synchronization of its internal node-level access attributes with the original IAM systems, creating a significant challenge for maintaining real-time pol-icy consistency, especially in heterogeneous environments. While these different architectures enable streamlined management within a single policy domain, they share a critical limitation: they require merging diverse access control models, such as RBAC [10] and ABAC [11], into a unified enforcement layer. This process is not only operationally burdensome but also introduces semantic mismatches and risks of unintended data leakage or privilege escalation due to flawed policy mapping. Distributed frameworks, by contrast, maintain policy autonomy by enforcing access control within each data provider’s environment. For instance, MediRAG [20] imple-ments a federated retrieval system across hospitals, using policy-based access control (PBAC) [11] at each node to ensure that organizations can independently define and enforce policies. This architecture preserves data sovereignty and aligns well with compliance requirements in sensi-tive domains like healthcare. However, MediRAG assumes that all nodes adopt a uniform PBAC model, which is often unrealistic. Real-world enterprises frequently employ heterogeneous IAM systems such as GCP IAM, AWS IAM, or Keycloak, each with its own authentication workflows, policy languages, and role hierarchies. Requiring standard-ization across such diverse systems introduces substantial adoption barriers. Furthermore, MediRAG lacks integration with these native IAM systems, making centralized gover-nance and cross-domain identity management difficult to scale. We address this gap by delegating authorization to each provider’s native IAM at retrieval time, rather than consolidating policy management. In environments where heterogeneous access control models such as RBAC, ABAC, and custom policies coexist across administrative domains, requiring centralized policy consolidation becomes highly impractical. Centralized RAG architectures struggle with the complexity and risk of merging diverse policies, while distributed frameworks often rely on a unified access control model that does not reflect real-world diversity. These limitations underscore the need for an alternative approach that can respect policy autonomy while still enabling efficient retrieval. To this end, we propose Permission-Aware RAG, a framework that supports fine-grained access control through real-time permission validation by directly interfacing with native IAM systems. This design enables secure and scalable retrieval across heterogeneous multi-resource environments without requiring structural reconfiguration. C. FEDERATED IDENTITY AND ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURES While Federated Identity Management (Federated IAM) provides the foundational layer for authentication in multi-service environments, recent surveys highlight persistent challenges such as privacy risks, attribute aggregation, and revocation [21], [22]. Privacy-preserving extensions like PRIMA enable selective disclosure and unlinkability between identity providers (IdPs) and service providers (SPs) [23]. Reference models such as the Reference Service Model Framework for Identity Management attempt to standardize identity management architectures across centralized, feder-ated, and user-centric models [24]. However, none of these approaches address the subsequent, more granular challenge of real-time, per-document authorization within retrieval-augmented systems. Our Permission-Aware RAG framework is designed to solve precisely this challenge. It operates on the principles of a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) [9], which mandates continuous verification for every access request. While Federated IAM establishes who the user is, our framework determines what that authenticated user is allowed to see at the moment of retrieval. By delegating this check to native IAM systems, we enforce ZTA’s least privilege principle for every retrieved resource, bridging a critical gap between fed-erated authentication and practical, secure, access-controlled retrieval in modern enterprise environments. This approach is also compatible with existing enterprise Single Sign-On (SSO) mechanisms, as it leverages the same IAM endpoints used for federated authentication. III. METHODOLOGY A. MOTIVATION FOR IAM-BASED INTEGRATION Modern enterprises use IAM systems such as AWS IAM, GCP IAM, Azure Active Directory (Azure AD), and Keycloak to manage fine-grained access control across their resources. These systems provide authentication, autho-rization, RBAC/ABAC policy support, audit logging, and version-controlled policy management to ensure security and regulatory compliance. For example, depending on service requirements, resources may be deployed across GCP, AWS, or on-premise environments. Organizational policies may mandate that certain data be processed exclusively on-premise for compliance reasons, while other services leverage cloud-based solutions. Although consolidating diverse access control policies into a single, unified policy across all services and organizations may be considered ideal, achieving such integration in practice requires extensive legal reviews, cross-institutional policy reconciliations, and thorough conflict analysis across heterogeneous access models [25]. These processes, such as policy mapping and role harmonization, are time-consuming and operationally burdensome, often delaying the deploy-ment of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems that require timely integration with external knowledge sources. To address this challenge, our framework integrates RAG systems with existing IAM infrastructures, enabling real-time access validation without requiring full policy unification. This design maintains the independent policy governance of each organization while ensuring compliance, operational feasibility, and immediate deployability. By leveraging the trusted IAM endpoints operated by each provider, the system maintains consistency with institutional policy structures (e.g., RBAC, ABAC, resource policies) and prevents seman-tic mismatches. It also integrates seamlessly with native IAM functionalities such as audit logging, policy evaluation, and token validation, thereby minimizing legal and compliance risks in multi-resource environments. B. THREAT MODEL Our framework’s security model is grounded in the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) principle of never trust, always verify, treating every document access request as a distinct transaction that requires explicit authorization [9]. Based on this, we use the STRIDE model to define our scope [26]. • Information Disclosure (In Scope): This is the primary threat our framework prevents. Conventional RAG systems implicitly trust any retrieved document, creating a significant risk of leaking sensitive information. Our framework mitigates this by enforcing real-time, per-document authorization against native IAMs. • Elevation of Privilege (In Scope): We address unin-tentional privilege escalation at the data access layer. By delegating authorization checks to the authoritative source (the native IAM), our framework prevents flawed logic, such as faulty policy merging, from granting users access to data beyond their intended scope. • Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, and Denial of Service (Out of Scope): Our framework focuses specifically on authorization and assumes other foun-dational security layers are in place. We assume user identity verification (spoofing) is handled by upstream authentication systems (e.g., SSO). Threats to data integrity (tampering), auditability (repudiation), and service availability (denial of service) are considered out of scope, to be addressed by underlying infrastructure security. C. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE The Permission-Aware RAG framework is designed to enable access control across multi-resource environments without requiring central policy merging. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the architecture’s modular pipeline is centered around the Permission Retriever, which utilizes a Credential Manager and an IAM Adapter to filter documents retrieved from the Vector Store, using details from the Metadata Store. This design ensures both maintainability and scalability. Each module addresses specific operational needs. For example, by separating the Credential Manager from the IAM Adapter, security credentials can be managed and updated independently of permission validation logic, ensuring flexi-bility and security. To enforce user-specific access rights, document permis-sions are delegated to the IAM systems operated by each service provider. This design preserves the independent policy governance of each organization while enabling real-time authorization checks without requiring unified policy consolidation. By avoiding the need to merge policies, the framework mitigates risks of semantic conflicts and ensures compatibility with heterogeneous access control models deployed by different institutions. The system operates in two primary stages: the Indexing Stage and the Query Stage, described below.
Paper
- Authors
- J. Jeong, S.-G. Lee
- Publication date
- 2025
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